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BREXIT AND SCOTLAND 
 




A striking contrast between the 1975 referendum on the United Kingdom’s (UK) continued 
membership of the (then) European Economic Community (EEC) and the 2016 European Union (EU) 
referendum – in addition to their differing outcomes – is the significance of territorial divergence.  In 
1975, although different results in the various parts of the UK had certainly been anticipated, in the 
event all four countries produced Yes majorities. 
 
Result of the 1975 EC referendum 
 Yes (%) No (%) Turnout (%) 
UK 67.2 32.8 64.0 
England 68.7 31.3 64.6 
Scotland 58.4 41.6 61.7 
Wales 64.8 35.2 66.7 
Northern Ireland 52.1 47.9 47.5 
 
In 2016, however, whereas England and Wales voted to Leave the EU, both Scotland and Northern 
Ireland voted to Remain.   
 
 Remain Leave Turnout 
UK 48.1 51.9 72.2 
England 46.6 53.4 73.0 
Scotland 62.0 38.0 67.2 
Wales 47.5 52.5 71.7 
Northern Ireland 55.8 44.2 62.7 
Gibraltar 95.9 4.1 83.5 
 
The Scottish majority in favour of EEC membership in 1975 was significantly lower than the UK-wide 
majority, and the two counting areas in the UK that recorded a vote against EEC membership were 
both in Scotland.  In 2016, by contrast, Scotland produced the strongest Remain vote of any area in 
the UK (Gibraltar excepted), and each Scottish local authority area also voted to Remain.  Although 
the Scottish National Party (SNP) had supported withdrawal in the 1970s, by 2016, no major Scottish 
party, including the Scottish Conservatives – and indeed, no major Scottish politician – was in favour 
of this position.  Euro-scepticism was simply not a significant feature of Scottish political debate, 
with UKIP consistently recording its lowest levels of electoral support in Scotland.  Euro-scepticism 
was an English rather than a British phenomenon (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 31).  Whereas the 
relationship between the UK and the European Union was a dominant feature of English 
constitutional debate from the early 1990s onwards, in Scotland, the European Question was 
crowded out by or subsumed within the Scottish Question: i.e. the relationship between Scotland 
and the British Union.  While EU membership had featured prominently in debates leading up to the 
2014 Scottish independence referendum, the main argument was about whether independence 
would jeopardise continued membership, not about its desirability (Douglas-Scott 2016). 
 
The differing territorial results in the 2016 referendum are thus symptomatic of profound shifts and 
divergences in constitutional politics within the UK.  But the Brexit referendum also speaks to an 
even more profoundly contested territorial constitution.  In other words, the cleavages revealed by 
the 2016 referendum concern not merely questions of constitutional vision, but also differing 
understandings of the constitutional significance of territorial divergence itself.  In 1975, although 
divergent territorial majorities would have been politically problematic, it is unlikely that in what was 
then conventionally (if not necessarily appropriately) understood as a unitary state – with a single 
legislature and a single source of sovereign authority – territorial divergence would have been 
regarded as constitutionally relevant.  Since the 1970s, however, the territorial constitution has 
developed into a multi-layered, asymmetric – and still evolving – system which severely challenges 
the assumptions of the traditional constitutional order, but without having clearly displaced them.  
Against this background, a key aspect of debates both before and since the 2016 referendum has 
thus concerned whether – and if so how – a territorially-divided result ought to be regarded as 
constitutionally significant.   
 
In this article, we consider what debates about the implications of the Brexit vote for Scotland reveal 
about the uncertain and contested nature of the UK’s territorial constitution.  We focus on two key 
areas of constitutional uncertainty which are implicated in the Brexit process.  The first is the 
question of entrenchment or legal security for the powers and institutions of devolved government; 
the second is the question of inter-governmental relations, and in particular the handling of issues of 
inter-twined competence.  We also show how responses to the territorially divided vote have been 
shaped by competing conceptualisations of the nature of the decision to withdraw from the EU – 
which themselves reflect deeper ambiguities in the way in which the UK constitution has adapted, or 
failed to adapt to EU membership. 
 
We start by outlining the relevant constitutional background.  We then explore how the question of 
territorial divergence in relation to Brexit was framed in debates both before and after the EU 
referendum, including in the litigation over the decision to trigger Article 50 TEU (Miller v Secretary 
of State for Exiting the European Union).  We conclude by considering how the Scottish dimension to 




In 1979, Vernon Bogdanor maintained that the strongest of its 'tacit understandings' was the 
'profoundly unitary nature of the United Kingdom, as expressed in the supremacy of Parliament.' 
(Bogdanor 1979: 7)  Implicit was the notion that the UK was one and indivisible, that each part was 
treated alike.  A range of alternative understandings emerged following challenges to the UK’s 
territorial integrity (Kellas; Rose 1982; Keating and Midwinter; Moore and Booth 1989; Mitchell 
1998; Paterson 1994).  These understandings highlighted existing institutional and public policy 
diversity.  The United Kingdom was described as centralised but not uniform.  The establishment of 
devolved institutions for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1999 further undermined the 
notion of the UK as a unitary state, both amongst scholars of the constitution and in official 
understandings.  In 2001, the newly created House of Lords Constitution Committee, in its first 
report, attempted to define the UK constitution.  It outlined five ‘basic tenets of the United Kingdom 
Constitution’: sovereignty of the crown in Parliament; the rule of law, encompassing the rights of the 
individual; union state; representative Government; membership of the Commonwealth, the 
European Union, and other international organisations (House of Lords 2001: para.17). But what was 
understood by the union state was unclear. 
 
The ambiguity in the union state comes down to the simple question of the territorial distribution of 
power.  While the union state or, more accurately the state of unions (Mitchell 2009), acknowledges 
institutional and public policy diversity, it says little about where power ultimately lies.  There had 
been much debate on whether and how the Scottish Parliament’s existence and powers could be 
entrenched.  The Constitutional Convention, established to devise a scheme of devolution between 
1989 and 1992, wrestled with this issue (see Paper of Constitutional Convention NAS GD489)It was 
founded on the principle of popular sovereignty – ‘the sovereign right of the Scottish people to 
determine the form of government best suited to their needs’ (Kellas 1992: 51)) – and was endorsed 
by almost all Labour MPs at the time, including Gordon Brown and John Smith, though Tony Blair 
was clear that the Westminster Parliament remained sovereign (Scotsman, 4 April 1997).  Could 
Westmister simply abolish the Scottish Parliament by a simple Act of Parliament?  Entrenchment 
was one of the outstanding issues that the Convention asked a Constitutional Commission to 
consider following the 1992 election.  It concluded that the Convention ‘endorses the principle of 
entrenchment in relation to Scotland’s Parliament... in order that these would be incapable of being 
unilaterally amended at a later date by the Westminster Parliament’ (Constitutional Commission 
1994: 22).  
 
In the first edition of his classic text, Bogdanor argued that it was ‘profoundly mistaken’ to think that 
power devolved meant power retained, ‘It is then in constitutional theory alone that full legislative 
power remains with London; and it is only in constitutional theory that the unitary state is 
preserved.  In practice, power will be transferred, and it cannot, except under pathological 
circumstances, be recovered’ (Bogdanor 1979: 217).  The Constitution Unit think tank, established in 
University College London in 1995, suggested that a ‘strong and explicit’ endorsement of devolution 
through a referendum might provide some entrenchment (Constitution Unit 1996).  In essence, this 
amounted to path dependent entrenchment in which the ‘costs of reversal are very high’ (Levi 1997: 
28).  It might have no legal entrenchment, but politically the referendum and continuing public 
support for a Scottish Parliament gave protection.  This emphasis on political rather than legal 
protection for devolved power was reinforced by the announcement during debates on the Scotland 
Bill of what became known as the Sewel Convention (after the Scottish Office minister Lord Sewel), 
i.e., the expectation that the UK Parliament would not normally exercise its continued power to 
legislate on matters devolved to the Scottish Parliament except with the consent of that Parliament.   
 
There remained the question of its powers and relations with the UK Government.  There had been 
assumptions that the devolved system of government involved the creation of something akin to 
dual federalism in which each level of government exercises ‘exclusive and nonoverlapping 
authority’.  This understanding had been a key motive behind support for devolution.  The Scottish 
Parliament was conceived as a defensive institution, designed to protect Scotland from Westminster 
Governments that sought to purse policies opposed by majority opinion in Scotland.  In introducing 
the devolution legislation in the House of Commons, Donald Dewar, explained the motivation, 
 
We all remember that embittered disaster of the poll tax and the investment in the private 
Health Care International hospital in Clydebank rather than in the national health service. We all 
remember that, while parents wanted investment in their children's education, energy and 
resources were devoted to encouraging schools to opt out, and almost none of them did.  This 
Bill is the means of ensuring that such madness - it was madness, with each and every one of 
those measures standing as an affront to the democratic wishes of the communities that the 
Administration responsible purported to represent - can certainly never happen again. We have 
won a popular mandate in the referendum, and we are now creating an institution that can 
speak for the people of Scotland, is closer to their needs and concerns, and is ultimately 
accountable to them (Hansard, Commons, 12 Jan 1998: Column 22). 
 
The dual federalism model had been largely discredited in scholarship on federalism and replaced 
with a variety of cooperative, interdependent and interactive models.  Grodzins’s metaphor of the 
marble cake, distinct from the dualist layered cake, viewed inter-governmental relations differently, 
‘No important activity of government in the United States is the exclusive province of one of the 
levels [of government], not even what may be regarded as the most national of national functions, 
such as foreign relations; not even the most local of local functions, such as police protection and 
park maintenance’ (Grodzins 1966: 8).  As soon became clear, devolved government was intimately 
connected with UK central government in banal everyday public policy (Mitchell 2010).  It did not 
operate as a form of dual government.  Bulman-Pozen and Gerken suggested that it was ‘puzzling 
that we rarely try to connect these competing visions [cooperative and dual federalism] and imagine 
how the state’s status as servant, insider, and ally might enable it to be a sometime dissenter, rival, 
and challenger’ (Bulman-Pozen and Gerken 2009: 102) and suggested that ‘uncooperative 
federalism’ exists when a state uses its ‘power to push federal authorities to take a new position, or 
when states relying on federal funds to create welfare programs that erode the foundations of the 
very policies they are being asked to carry out’ (Ibid.:103 ).  These would be key questions to be 
addressed under the system of devolution.  It was easy to think that devolved government had 
involved either a form of dual or cooperative federalism in the early years when there was relative 
ideological congruence with Labour dominant in London and the main party of government in 
Scotland and, at least as important, when public finances reduced friction.  The test of devolution 
would come with ideological incongruence and the public finances were under stress.   
 
This blurring of boundaries in public policy terms was evident in the field of ‘foreign policy’.  While 
states were traditionally seen as the key actors in international politics, there was mounting 
evidence over recent decades of sub-state governments cutting out roles on the international stage.  
A distinction was drawn by Duchacek between ‘initiatives and activities of a non-central government 
abroad that graft a more or less separatist message on to its economic, social, and cultural links with 
foreign nations’, referred to as proto-diplomacy and ‘activities parallel to, often coordunated with, 
complementary to, and sometimes in conflict with centre-to-centre macro-diplomacy’ referred to as 
para-diplomacy (Duchacek 1990: 27, 32).  These developments arise from divergent objective and 
perceptual within states (Soldatos 1990: 44-49) but a ‘multi-vocal’ state might create ‘dissonance’ or 
‘nuanced harmony’ (Duchacek 1986: 223).  If the Scottish Parlaiment was politically entrenched, 
would it have the capability to undermine UK policy or eke out a distinct policy profile or use 
overlapping jurisdictions involved in this interdependent system in an area formally reserved for 
Westminster? 
 
It was little surprise that debate on Scottish devolution should include debate on how a Scottish 
Parliament should engage with the international community and particularly relations with the 
EEC/EU.  The main report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, published less than a year 
after the UK joined the EEC, had dismissed the EEC’s relevance for devolution though a minority 
report issued by two Commissioners thought the main report had ‘serisouly underestimated the 
likely consequences’ of membership of the EEC (Crowther-Hunt and Peacock 1973: para.12).  Prior to 
devolution, the Conservative Government was wary of supporting an office in Brussels representing 
Scottish interests (Mitchell 1995).  The European question had been one of the three difficult issues, 
along with the electoral system and relations between London and Edinburgh, that confronted the 
Constitutional Convention when it drew up a scheme of devolution in the period before Labour 
came to office in 1997 (NAS GD489.1.1).  One of the Convention’s working group concluded that 
there was a consensus on need for a Scottish representative office in Brussels and a statutory 
entitlement for the Scottish Parliament/Executive representation in UK Ministerial delegations (Ibid.: 
GD489.1.2).  Opponents of devolution feared that devolved government would seek to pursue 
contrary goals to UK central government.  The Scottish National Party had launched its 
‘Independence in Europe’ policy in 1988, arguing that Scotland needed to be represented in EEC’s 
decision-making.  The challenge for devolutionists was to find a voice in the European policy process 
for the devolved institutions that would not undermine UK central government.  They sought the 
institutional expression of para-diplomacy and avoid proto-diplomacy. 
 
In their 2002 study, Bulmer et al suggested that devolution had ‘engendered a shift to a form of 
multi-level governance more in line with the European model and involving a dispersal of authority 
with the allocation of functions and activities to different levels of governance’ (Bulmer et al 2002: 
159).  This followed from a ‘number of contradictory dynamics’ (Jeffery and Palmer 2007: 218): 
 The UK central state has (asymmetrically) devolved significant competences to new 
institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
 Responsibility for aspects of many of those competences – for example in agriculture, 
economic development, environment, transport – has already been transferred to the EU 
level 
 So the devolved institutions can only exercise ‘their’ competences if they can contribute to 
EU decision-making processes in those fields 
 But the UK centre regards the EU as an aspect of foreign policy, for which it has exclusive 
responsibility 
 And the EU is constituted by member states as represented by central governments and 
recognises regions only in an advisory role. (ibid.) 
(Non-statutory) Joint Ministerial Committees (JMCs) were set up bringing together Ministers from 
UK central Government and the devolved administrations to discuss matters of mutual interest.  The 
JMC (Europe) was unusual in meeting regularly since its establishment and allowed the devolved 
administrations to be consulted on EU policy.  An assessment of the operation of JMCs published in 
2007 concluded that the JMC (Europe) was the only JMC to have conformed with ‘Donald Dewar’s 
original vision of the role of the JMC’ (Trench 2007: 167). 
 
Nevertheless, both the question of entrenchment and the machinery for inter-governmental 
relations (IGR) continued to be regarded as weaknesses of the devolution arrangements.  Lack of 
constitutional security for Scottish institutions, and the absence of an effective Scottish voice in 
matters formally reserved to the UK level were also key elements of the constitutional case made by 
proponents of independence in debates leading up to the 2014 independence referendum (McHarg 
2016: ???).  The Smith Commission, set up to consider reforms to devolution in the wake of the 
referendum, recommended both a statutory guarantee of the permanence of the devolved 
institutions and that the Sewel Convention be put on a statutory footing, and identified a need for 
the IGR machinery to be strengthened (Smith Commission 2014: 14).  The former recommendations 
were implemented by sections 1 and 2 of the Scotland Act 2016, albeit hedged about with continued 
insistence that these remained essentially political guarantees and did not affect the continuing 
sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament (see Himsworth 2016).  But suggestions that basic 
principles of inter-governmental co-operation should be put on statutory footing (see Devolution 
(Further Powers) Committee 2016: ???) continued to be resisted. 
 
Brexit and the Territorial Constitution 
 
The EU referendum demonstrates very starkly the importance of, as well as the uncertainty 
surrounding, issues of both constitutional security and constitutional voice for the devolved 
institutions in Scotland and elsewhere.  Given the intertwined nature of competences across the 
devolved, UK and EU levels, EU law operates not merely as an external constraint upon devolved 
decision-making, but as a key element in the policy-making process within a dispersed and multi-
level system of government.  The decision to withdraw from the EU, although in formal terms a 
matter reserved to the UK level (Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5, Pt 1, para 7(1)), therefore necessarily has 
major implications for the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament.  The removal of the 
obligation to comply with EU law (Scotland Act 1998, s29(2)(d)) and the ‘repatriation’ of functions 
currently exercised at EU level raises a range of questions concerning the future scope and exercise 
of devolved competences, the balance of power between the UK and Scottish levels, and how the 
constraining and homogenising functions performed by, and the policy supports provided by, the EU 
will be replicated in future, if at all.   
 
In other words, the referendum gives rise to questions of constitutional security concerning the 
degree of control that the devolved institutions are able to exercise in determining how Brexit will 
affect devolved decision-making, and questions of constitutional voice, in terms of how much 
influence they are able to exert over the form that Brexit takes, or indeed whether it happens at all.  
These are questions which would arise irrespective of whether there were divergent territorial 
majorities.  But the fact that Scotland voted so clearly to Remain, and the explicit link drawn by the 
SNP in its 2016 Holyrood election manifesto between withdrawal from the EU contrary to the wishes 
of a majority of Scottish voters and the ‘material change in circumstances’ necessary to justify a 
second independence referendum (Scottish National Party 2016: 24), have substantially increased 
their political importance. 
 
Responses to these questions have naturally been shaped by a range of different factors, including 
considerations of political opportunism and institutional positioning.  However, an important factor 
has been competing conceptualisations of the Brexit decision, which in turn seem to reflect different 
understandings of the relationship between the UK and the EU.  Is it, on the one hand, a matter of 
foreign affairs; a question simply of adjusting one of the UK’s external relationships, and therefore 
properly reserved to the UK government?  Or should it, on the other hand, be seen as a matter of 
constitutional reform, thereby requiring a shared process of redrawing and rebuilding the UK’s 
multi-level constitutional architecture in light of the removal of one of its major elements? 
 
Dual Majority, Vetoes and Multi-Level Governance 
 
Prior to the Brexit referendum Nicola Sturgeon had argued for a ‘double majority’ provision, an idea 
familiar to the EU member states, which would require a majority in each component nation of the 
UK for Leave.  The argument was also made in the Commons during debates on the European Union 
Referendum Bill.  SNP MPs referred to federal states, including the United States, in which 
constitutional amendment required similar double majorities but this was rejected by other 
Members from across the Commons.  A Welsh Labour MP argued that the Bill referred to 
international treaties which would not be subject to a double majority in the United States as such 
matters would be determined by the executive branch and confirmed by the Senate with no veto 
rights for individual states.  This understanding of the devolved polity involves a significant break 
with any past understandings of the UK as a unitary state or state of unions but might signify a 
shift towards a federal constitution.  Theresa May’s off-hand reference to Scotland, Wales, 
Northern Ireland and England flourishing ‘side-by-side as equal partners’ in her 2012 Scottish 
Conservative conference speech (May 2012), and rhetoric during and immediately after the 
independence referendum concerning a federal-type arrangement, might give sustenance to a 
political claim to the need for a double majority but highlights the highly contested nature of 
understandings of the UK constitution.  A Conservative MP objected insisting that on matters of 
foreign affairs ‘we speak as a nation with one voice’ (HC Deb 16 June 2015, col.189) rejecting SNP 
claims that the UK was a ‘multinational state’ (HC Deb 16 June 2015 col.190). 
 
There were three aspects to this debate.  First, there was the question of the SNP’s preferred 
outcome.  Kenneth Clarke intervened to suggest that the ‘secret wish’ of the SNP is for ‘Scotland to 
vote yes and England to vote no’ as this would mean that the ‘end of the United Kingdom would 
probably be quite imminent’ (Ibid.).  There was much speculation along these lines during the 
referendum.  The SNP insisted that its preference was for a Yes majority across the UK.  Its reasoning 
was that an independent Scotland would be at a disadvantage if it was not part of the same common 
market as its large immediate neighbour.  While there might be tactical advantage in highlighting the 
divergence of Scottish and rUK opinion, there would be significant challenges that would need to be 
addressed in any second independence referendum. 
 
Second, there was the issue of the line between domestic and foreign affairs.  One of the objections 
to the EU from its opponents was that the ‘competence creep’ of European institutions had intruded 
into domestic affairs beyond that which had been envisaged when the UK joined in 1973.  In July 
2012, the UK launched a two year review of the balance of competences producing 32 reports.  The 
final report was on ‘Subsidiarity and Proportionality’ noted the evidence from a range of bodies, 
including the Scottish Government, on the ‘importance of adequate structures, processes and time 
frames to ensure adequate consultation of devolved administrations and assemblies, as well as local 
authorities, within the UK on EU proposals’ (HMG 2014:  3.54).  The reports highlight the manner in 
which European integration has undermined any notion of a sharp boundary between domestic and 
foreign affairs as the minority report of the Kilbrandon Commission had presciently noted.  
 
Third, it would be difficult, therefore, to extend the already discredited notion of a discrete dual 
system of devolved and central government to include a third discrete level.  As has been long 
acknowledged, the EU has been a complex system, often described as a system of ‘multi-level 
governance’ though ‘level’ may convey an absent discreteness.  The overlapping, complex, quotidian 
relations involved in this system of multi-level governance means that leaving the EU would have 
significant implications for the devolved administrations. 
 
There was never any prospect of the UK Government conceding a double majority but there are 
issues concerning the extent to which and manner in which a Scottish voice would be heard in 
debates on the implementation of Brexit.  If the devolved administration were unable to veto Brexit, 
could they influence its nature or could a special dispensation be permitted.  Scotland was not the 
only part of the UK to have rejected Brexit.  Northern Ireland and London had also voted to Remain.  
Northern Ireland’s situation was complicated by Strand Two of the Belfast Agreement on relations 
between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic (HMG 1998).  Concerns that Brexit would result in a 
hard border on the island of Ireland with the potential to disrupt the peace process and London’s 
economic status required special attention.  There were interests other than geographic interests 
that required to be accommodated.  There has been speculation on the nature of a deal done with 
Nissan to ensure the Japanese company invested in Sunderland by the UK Government (Münchau 
2016). 
 
The UK Government is caught in a classic two-level game (Putnam 1988), negotiating with competing 
domestic demands in which Scotland is only one, and conducting negotiations with EU27.  Its 
domestic negotiations pressures are considerable. While the Scottish Government might find allies 
both domestically and at the international level, it enters a crowded field of institutions pursuing 
divergent interests.  The expectations of many leading supporters of Brexit pull the May 
Government in a different direction from the Scottish Government.  While the Scottish Government 
has been warmly received across Europe since the referendum, there has been a very clear message 
from the European Union that no deal would be acceptable which would leave the UK better off to 
avoid sending a signal to remaining member states that leaving was cost free or attractive. 
 
The Miller Litigation, the Sewel Convention and the Nature of the Territorial Constitution 
 
The question of how and by whom the decision to leave the EU should be taken was unexpectedly 
reopened in the wake of the referendum.  While it was clearly recognised that the referendum result 
was in legal terms merely advisory, since the European Union Referendum Act 2015 specified no 
legal consequences that should flow from a Leave (or indeed a Remain) vote, insofar as the issue had 
been considered at all prior to the referendum, it was assumed that a Leave majority would provide 
sufficient political justification for the UK Government to give notification of the UK’s intention to 
withdraw from the EU under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, relying on its prerogative 
powers to conduct foreign affairs (see Phillip Hammond MP,HC Deb Vol 606, col 517, 25 February 
2016).  However, legal opinions began circulating shortly after the referendum (see in particular 
Barber et al 2016) arguing that, since Parliament had expressed its intention in the European 
Communities Act 1972 (ECA) and related statutes that the UK should be a member of the EU, and 
that rights derived from EU law should be available in domestic law, this intention could not be 
frustrated by the government acting under the prerogative alone.  In order to fulfil the UK’s 
“constitutional requirements” for a decision to withdraw from the EU under Article 50, it was 
argued, it would be necessary for the UK Parliament to enact a further statute authorising 
withdrawal.  This argument was taken up in a crowd-funded legal challenge before the Divisional 
Court in London (R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Leaving the European Union). 
 
The Miller case was important because it, in effect, rejected the UK Government’s characterisation 
of the withdrawal decision as a matter of foreign affairs and effectively ‘reconstitutionalised’ it.  This 
then opened up an opportunity, following the claimants’ somewhat unexpected success in the 
Divisional Court ([2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin)), for the Scottish Government to revive its claim that 
that withdrawal required devolved consent, this time via the Sewel Convention.  At the same time, 
the decision of the Northern Irish High Court (McCord and Agnew [2016] NIQB 85) in separate 
proceedings raised in Belfast made it imperative for the Scottish Government to intervene for 
defensive reasons.  Although the Northern Irish court held that legislation was not required to trigger 
Article 50, it also held that, even if it had been, such legislation would not engage the Sewel 
Convention because, at least in Northern Ireland, the Convention applied only to legislation affecting 
matters within the scope of devolved competence, not to legislation varying the scope of devolved 
competence.  Had this ruling been allowed to stand, it could have created significant problems for 
the Scottish Government’s ability to influence the implementation of Brexit via the promised Great 
Repeal Bill and related legislation, in particular the question of where competences ‘repatriated’ 
from Brussels should be exercised in future.  Accordingly, when the UK Government appealed the 
Divisional Court’s decision in Miller to the Supreme Court, the Lord Advocate intervened on behalf of 
the Scottish Government, as did the Counsel General for Wales on behalf of the Welsh Government. 
 
The interventions from the devolved governments, together with the joining of the Attorney General 
for Northern Ireland’s reference to the Supreme Court of the various devolution issues raised in 
McCord and Agnew with the Miller appeal, gave the Supreme Court proceedings a very different 
flavour to the Divisional Court case.  Whereas the Divisional Court’s decision was very narrowly 
focussed on the historically-central constitutional relationship between the UK Parliament and the 
Crown, the various devolution submissions presented a more radical and pluralist vision of the 
location of constitutional authority within the UK, albeit one which continued to play down 
(somewhat problematically from a Scottish and Northern Irish perspective) the constitutional 
significance of the referendum result itself.  
 
The Lord Advocate’s argument proceeded in two stages.  First, he agreed with the Miller claimants 
that an Act of Parliament was required to trigger Article 50.  However this was not merely because of 
the impact on the ECA, but also because of its effects on the Scotland Act 1998.  Because of the 
interweaving of devolved competences and EU law, Brexit would necessarily affect the scope of 
devolved competences, by removing both the obligation on the devolved institutions to act 
compatibly with EU law and the Scottish Government’s responsibility for implementing and 
observing EU law in areas within devolved competence.  Secondly, for the same reason, he argued 
that legislation authorising withdrawal would be subject to a requirement to gain the consent of the 
Scottish Parliament under the Sewel Convention, because as the Convention has operated in 
Scotland, consent is required where UK legislation affects the scope of devolved competence and 
not merely an existing devolved competence.  Although he accepted that, as a matter of convention, 
the Supreme Court could not enforce an obligation to seek devolved consent, the Lord Advocate 
argued that it was nevertheless open to the Court to declare what was required by the Convention 
as part of the “constitutional requirements” referred to in Article 50.  Moreover, this argument was 
strengthened by the fact that, as noted above, the Sewel Convention had been placed on a statutory 
footing for Scotland by section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016.   
 
The UK Government’s response was to argue that the devolution statutes, like the ECA, assumed but 
did not require EU membership, and that in any case, since foreign affairs, including relations with 
the EU, is a reserved matter, they could not have been said, either expressly or by necessary 
implication, to have “occupied the field” in relation to EU withdrawal such as to oust the foreign 
affairs prerogative.  Indeed, far from being a central part of the devolution schemes, the UK 
government characterised the EU law provisions in the devolution statutes as essentially belt and 
braces provisions, designed simply to ensure that the UK’s international law obligations in relation to 
EU law are complied with.  As the Advocate General for Scotland (the UK Government’s Scottish Law 
Officer), Lord Keen of Elie, put it in oral argument,  
 
Nothing in the issue of Article 50 or its notification or indeed withdrawal from the EU 
altogether alters the existence of the devolved legislatures, or the essential structure and 
architecture of the devolution settlements. (Transcript, 6 December 2016, 80 – 81) 
 
It followed, according to the UK Government, that no requirement of devolved consent arose.  But in 
any case, it argued that, as matter purely of convention, the legislative consent requirement was 
non-justiciable, and that the 2016 Act had made essentially no difference to its legal status.  Again, 
according to Lord Keen ‘it was made perfectly clear during the passage of the Scotland Act 2016 that 
the intention was simply to incorporate in statutory form the existing convention and no more than 
that’ (Transcript, 6 December 2016, 104). 
 
In its decision (by an 8 – 3 majority) that legislation was required to authorise withdrawal, the 
Supreme Court essentially ducked the devolution issues.  On the question of the impact of EU 
withdrawal on the devolution settlement, the decision was ambiguous and ultimately inconclusive.  
Whilst initially appearing to accept the UK Government’s characterisation of the relationship 
between the devolution statutes and EU law ([2017] UKSC 5 at [129] to [130]), the majority decision 
(with which the dissenting judges agreed on these points) went on to accept that withdrawal from 
the EU would, by removing the obligation on the devolved institutions to comply with EU law, 
expand devolved competences and would thereby remove rights granted on citizens to challenge 
the actions of the devolved institutions on the basis of EU law (ibid, [130] to [131]).  The court went 
on to say: 
 
As already explained, it is normally impermissible for statutory rights to be removed by the 
exercise of prerogative powers in the international sphere. It would accordingly be 
incongruous if constraints imposed on the legislative competence of the devolved 
administrations by specific statutory provisions were to be removed, thereby enlarging that 
competence, other than by statute. A related incongruity arises by virtue of the fact that 
observance and implementation of EU obligations are a transferred matter and therefore 
the responsibility of the devolved administration in Northern Ireland. The removal of a 
responsibility imposed by Parliament by ministerial use of prerogative powers might also be 
considered a constitutional anomaly. (ibid, [132]) 
 
However, the court ultimately declined to reach a definitive view on whether the EU provisions in 
the devolution statutes imposed a discrete requirement for legislative authorisation of withdrawal, 
over and above the requirement it had already decided arose from the ECA. 
 
On the application of the Sewel Convention, the decision was similarly inconclusive.  Taking a very 
conservative line, the court held that while it was permitted to recognise the operation of 
conventions where this was relevant to the resolution of a legal question, it could neither enforce 
them nor adjudicate upon their operation or scope because ‘those matters are determined within 
the political world.’ (ibid, [146])  The court also held that the status of the Sewel Convention had not 
been changed by section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016.  Given the wording of section 2, the court 
considered that the UK Parliament was: 
 
not seeking to convert the Sewel Convention into a rule which can be interpreted, let alone 
enforced, by the courts; rather, it is recognising the convention for what it is, namely a 
political convention, and is effectively declaring that it is a permanent feature of the relevant 
devolution settlement…. the purpose of the legislative recognition of the convention was to 
entrench it as a convention. (ibid, [148] – [149]) 
 
In concluding that there was therefore no legal requirement to seek the consent of the devolved 
legislatures to an EU withdrawal Bill, the court was careful not to suggest that there was no such 
requirement at all.  On the contrary, the court stated that: 
 
In reaching this conclusion we do not underestimate the importance of constitutional 
conventions … The Sewel Convention has an important role in facilitating harmonious 
relationships between the UK Parliament and the devolved legislatures. But the policing of 
its scope and the manner of its operation does not lie within the constitutional remit of the 
judiciary, which is to protect the rule of law. (ibid, [151]) 
 
This nuanced conclusion was, perhaps predictably, lost in the reporting of the decision.  
Unsurprisingly, the UK Government sought to grasp a partial victory from its broader defeat in 
Miller, immediately declaring that the ruling meant that no devolved consent was required to a 
withdrawal Bill.  The Scottish Government, equally predictably (and with some justification) asserted 
the contrary view that devolved consent was required and declared its intention to table a 
Legislative Consent Motion (LCM) before the Scottish Parliament.  In the event, however, it chose 
not to do so, claiming that there was insufficient time to do so given the accelerated timetable for 
consideration of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill at Westminster.  Instead, a 
motion was debated in the Scottish Parliament on 7 February 2017 that ‘the Parliament agrees … 
that the UK Government’s European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill should not proceed’, 
inter alia because ‘the UK Government has set out no provision for effective consultation with the 
devolved administrations on reaching an agreed UK approach to the negotiations on implementing 
Article 50’, which was passed by a majority of 90 to 34.  Whether the timetable was the real reason 
for not pressing ahead with a formal LCM is not clear.  It may be that the Scottish Government 
feared that an LCM would be rejected by the Presiding Officer, or decided that it would be 
preferable to avoid a direct confrontation with the UK Parliament (and thereby avoid setting a 
precedent for overriding a refusal of consent), or that a formal LCM would be less likely gain cross-
party support. 
 
The Miller decision was not entirely a defeat for the Scottish Government.  In formal terms, it left it 
in no worse position in relation to the withdrawal decision itself than it would have been if the UK 
Government had been able to trigger Article 50 under prerogative powers.  And it at least avoided 
any unhelpful legal ruling on the scope of the Sewel Convention that might have undermined its 
argument that the Great Repeal Bill and other implementing legislation will require an LCM.  
However, the hardening of positions that litigation usually engenders may itself have contributed to 
the UK Government’s apparent unwillingness to concede any special treatment for Scotland in 
relation to Brexit.  In addition, the Court’s ruling that Sewel is non-justiciable, notwithstanding the 
2016 Act, means that there is no possibility of appealing to an independent arbiter in the event that 
the UK Government chooses to ignore Sewel in future. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision to avoid the issues that devolution raises was perhaps not surprising, 
but at the same time not inevitable.  It is clear from both domestic and foreign precedents that the 
justices could have been bolder in pronouncing on the meaning of convention if they had wished to 
do so.  It is also by no means inconceivable that, in a different context, the court might have been 
more reluctant to conclude that statutory recognition of the Sewel Convention had no legal effect 
whatsoever.  The unusually politically-sensitive nature of the Miller case (manifested in overt attacks 
on judges in the wake of the Divisional Court’s ruling) may have deterred the court from adopting an 
expansive view of its constitutional role, given that distinguishing the legal question of how Article 
50 was to be triggered from the political question of whether Brexit was desirable was essential to 
the maintenance of its legitimacy.  Nevertheless, the structural position of the Supreme Court, as a 
UK institution which essentially replicates the balance of power in the territorial constitution, may 
undermine its ability to construct an account of the constitution which acknowledges its plural and 
contested nature.  This perhaps does not bode well for future cases in which competing 
understandings of the territorial constitution might also be at stake, such as a dispute about the 
legality of a second independence referendum (see Anderson et al, 2012). 
 
The case has also exposed the limitations of the Sewel Convention as a mechanism for managing 
territorial relations in two ways.  First, it underlines the weakness of relying on convention to modify 
an essentially unitary legal understanding of the nature of the state.  The Supreme Court’s claim that 
the effect of section 2 of the 2016 Act was to politically entrench the convention is no sort of 
entrenchment at all, since in the absence of any enforcement mechanism, it still relies on the good 
will of the UK institutions for its observance.   
 
Secondly, the Scottish Government’s case in Miller was arguably seeking to over-extend the function 
of the Sewel Convention.  What was conceived as a mechanism for protecting the autonomy of the 
devolved institutions against legislative encroachment (Elliott, 2015), has been relied upon to assert 
a more general principle of territorial consent to constitutional change – a principle for which the 
shared constitutional understanding necessary to give rise to a binding conventional obligation is not 
(yet) present.  Whilst Brexit underlines the necessity of such a mechanism in a territorially-divided 
polity, the political divisions exposed by the Brexit vote make it much less likely that a shared 
constitutional understanding will emerge.  In short, a conventionally-based constitution is one which 
requires a high degree of consensus about constitutionally-appropriate behaviour.  Where such 
consensus is lacking, conventions are themselves likely to become a site of political contestation 
rather than reliable constitutional guarantees. 
 
Whither the Territorial Constitution? 
 
The enactment of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 and the Prime 
Minister’s subsequent letter to the President of the European Commission on 29 March 2017 bring 
one set of debates about the constitutional significance of Scotland’s Remain vote to a close.  
However, attention now moves on to new constitutional questions.  The forthcoming Great Repeal 
Bill will test the ability of the mechanisms of the political constitution to provide adequate security 
and voice for the devolved governments in protecting their interests in the implementation of Brexit.  
More dramatically, the denial of a decisive Scottish constitutional voice in the Brexit decision has 
reopened the option of a constitutional exit in the form of a second independence referendum. 
 
In anticipation of Theresa May’s triggering of Article 50 without securing the consent of the Scottish 
Government to the proposed shape of the Brexit negotiations, Nicola Sturgeon announced on 13 
March her intention to seek the agreement of the UK Government to facilitate the holding of a 
lawful independence referendum in Autumn 2019.  This request was confirmed by a majority vote in 
the Scottish Parliament on 28 March (Motion S5M-04710 (Nicola Sturgeon) SPOR, 28 March 2017 
(Session 5)).  As had occurred in relation to the 2014 referendum, the would involve the enactment 
of an Order in Council under section 30 of the Scotland Act to make clear that the reservation of the 
Union (Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5 Part 1 para 1 (b)) did not include a referendum on independence.  
The Prime Minister’s response was to dismiss this request on the basis that the time was not right 
for another independence referendum, a stance made easier by the fact that, despite Scotland’s 
majority for remaining in the EU, Brexit has not (yet) had the decisive impact on support for 
independence that some had anticipated.  The Scottish Question, it would seem, continues to trump 
the European one. 
 
Nevertheless, at the time of writing, it is unclear whether the Scottish Government might seek to 
proceed with a referendum Bill anyway – the question of Holyrood’s legal competence to authorise 
a referendum having been sidestepped rather than resolved in relation to the 2014 vote.  Such a 
move would be certain to provoke further litigation, in which the constitutional authority of the 
Scottish Parliament, and the ability of the UK constitution to recognise competing sovereignty claims 
would be directly implicated.  The weakness of the political constitution in the face of the legal 
constitution which was demonstrated in Miller perhaps gives limited grounds for optimism that the 
Scottish Government would prevail.  On the other hand, if Scottish public opinion shifts decisively in 
favour of a second referendum, it is hard to imagine that the UK Government could continue to 
obstruct it for long.  While the UK constitution may not have the legal capacity to adequately 
accommodate Scots’ claims for constitutional recognition, neither does it have to political strength 
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